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[lto '] 
AN AI:CE ACPC;S[; THE PACIFIC 
by Mike ~ansfield 
The historian Henry Brooks Adams ~.,rrote in 1907 that "all 
experience is an arch to build upon." He \vas ~niting , about his 
own education, but it is an apt thought about the experience of 
nations as well. I have 1n mind, for example, the experience 
of Japan and the United States . In the years since the end of 
tl:e Second Horld h'ar Japan has emerged as a major economic 
po•.-.rer. Its relations with the v1orld and especially with the 
United States have broadened and become increasingly complex . 
.Curing the past ten years alone , there has been a significant 
strengthening of the relationship between our two nations. We 
have used the ra\1 materials of our past experience as an arch 
to bridge the the occasional troubled waters in our trade 
relations or to reach agreements on the issue of regional 
security. And today our partnership across the Pacific is 
stronger and our relations more interwoven than ever before. 
I want to reflect on the construction of that 
partnership, especi a lly during the past decade. \l"ben this 
magazine, Trends, was first published in the fall of 1971, just 
one decade ago, the United States and Japan \Jere experiencins a 
relationship that had all the ups and downs of a 1\!ontana 
horizon. The 19GO Security ':'reaty had just the year before 
reached the age when either side could give one year's notice 
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of its abrogation. A good deal of attention was given that 
fact. tlore than 700, 000 people throughout Japan demonstrated 
against the Treaty on June 23 of that year. But our 
governments and the majorities they rep rensented were able to 
weather that storn and reconfirm the value of the agreement 
which has meant so much to our mutual security. 
hnd t he day after the ~ecurity Treaty demonst r ations 
there was, in Washington, D.C., a breakdown in the textile 
negotiations. This ~;as the first sharp trade conflict betHeen 
our two nations. The deadlock in the negotiations was fixed on 
the time limit that voluntary quotas wou ld remain i n effect. 
The Japanese negotiators pressed for a one year limit while our 
side insisted on three. The economic facts of the discussion 
were confused by threats of protectionist legislation from the 
Congress. hfter years of offers and counter-offers across the 
Pacific both sides groped their way to an acceptable agreement 
to licit Japanese exports of textiles to the United Staten. 
Then there were the discussions regarding the reversion 
of CJ.:: inaHa. Although Prime Minister Sate and President Nixon 
had agreed on l-Tovember 21, 1969, that Okina~1a would be restored 
to Japan in 1972, many technical problems haC to be worked 
out. The time was difficult. ~~ were ending our involvement 
in the VietnaM conflict. There \lere questions about whether 
the limitations of the 1960 ~ecurity Treaty shoulc apply to 
GJ..: i na .... a. Together, in spite of the difficult times and 
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difficult questions , we came to satisfactory agreements . 
But all these events , landma r ks of the early 1970s, 
changed the relationship between the two countri es . Japan 
matured anJ entered "the age of choice ." The United States 
became aware it was dealing with an equal . Significantly , 
there was not a single demonstration asainst the security 
treaty on its twentieth anniversary last year and the United 
States and Japan now , concerning textiles, find themselves on 
the sarne side of the fence , looking at textile exports from 
Korea and Taiwan. 
From the i ssues of a decade ago , from the experience of 
dealing v/i th those issues 1 We have learned we have more in 
common than we have differences . ~~ have learned to seek joint 
solutions to what apparently appears to many of those in the 
news business as irreconcilable conflicts . 
We learned from the textile negotiations, for example, a 
great deal about one another and the political nature of our 
economies . We are both free market economies heavily dependent 
upon international trade , both have considerable capital in 
foreign investments , both depend on imports -- Japan to a 
greater degree -- of energy and raw materials . Eut these 
similarities do not mean we have learned enough to prevent the 
r ecurrence of bilateral trade disputes throughout this last 
decade . Part of the problem has been the turnaround of the 
flow of products . The United States had traditionally sold 
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more to Japan than it bought . But in the mid 1960s the balance 
changed , and ever since Japan has enjoyed a trade surplus . 
Dur ing the early 1970s the U. S. economy suffered from 
slow g r oHth , inflation and balance of payment deficits whicr; 
were par tly the result of the Vietnam conflict and partly 
industrial maturation . At the same time, Japan's economy was 
g r owing robustly and the country enjoyed a substantial boon in 
the American markets . The disputes began . In addition to the 
problem over Japan ' s textile exports , there were bilateral 
disagreements over exchange rates and Japan's domestic uarket, ,. 
apparently closed to our exports. 
And later in the decade , when Japan was more successful 
than the United States in adjusting to soaring oil prices , 
Japan's large global current account surplus and bilateral 
trade surplus with the United States aqain strained bilateral 
relations . 
v:hile I have served as Ar.tbassador to Japan we have had to 
come to grips with a number of difficult bilateral trade 
problems . l~en one considers the magnitude of the problems we 
have faced and the willingness of both sides to make real 
sacrifices to achieve r.;utually acceptable solutions , He can say· 
that the strength of the relationship was truly tested . And 
made strony in the process . 
I an not surpris~d I think it is simply inevitable 
that there is occasional stress between the two largest 
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economies in the free world. Economic relations as close as 
ours must now and then collide. This was the case in 1977 and 
1978 when the large Japanese global current account surplus, 
the U.S. global current account deficit, a heavy imbalance in 
bilateral trade, the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the color 
TV dumping charge, the steel issue and a number of other trade 
problems clashed together, resulting in a period of almost 
constant negotiation. But we have emerged from this period 
with only a few dents and our trade ties, and our friendship, 
intact. 
The Japanese Government cooperated greatly in resolving 
the economic issues between our two countries. In 1978 and 
1979, it used fiscal policy to stimulate the economy and induce 
increased consumption of imports. At the same time, it 
unilaterally cut tariffs on 318 items, removed quota controls 
on 12 products and increased beef, citrus juice, and orange 
quotas. Japan ratified the codes negotiated in the MTN and 
agreed to tariff reductions. Since the end of the HTN, the 
United States and Japan have agreed, in effect, to extend the 
coverage of the government procurement code to 
telecommunication equipment purchases by NTT and entered into 
an understanding with us on product standards. 
Most recently, Japan successfully defused protectionist 
sentiment in the United States over the automobile problem by 
voluntarily restraining its exports under a three year 
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program. No one is completely satisfied with constraints on 
free trade, but perhaps that is an indication of how fairly 
everyone has been asked to sacrifice. President Reagan has 
made it clear, as has Mr. Regan of the Treasury, that the 
principle of free trade will be defended by this 
administration. Yet the situation in which the American auto 
industry found itself and the situation was not essentially 
the fault of Japanese automakers -- generated understandable 
concern within many members of the U.S. Congress. The decision 
by Japan to slow exports has lessened that concern. The 
American auto industry has a great deal of work to do before it 
can get back on its feet, and this short breathing spell will 
go a long way in ensuring that recovery. 
This is the history of our relationship then: He 
recognize, as we did with the auto issue, that we are faced 
with common problems. A common chasm to cross and we are 
together using our shared experience to construct the arch 
aross that chasm. He have contructed , for example: 
--A prestigious group of Japanese and Americans, led by 
Ambassadors Ingersoll and Ushiba, vJas formed to assess our 
expanding economic relationship in the larger context of our 
shared global responsibilities and to make recommendations. 
This group, called the Wisemen, was unofficial and independent, 
but its reports and recommendations meant that both sides are 
now better informed about the varying perspectives -- the 
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political, business, agricultural, labor, academic and 
bureaucratic -- of our economic relationship. 
--Tile United States-Japan Trade Study Group is a 
voluntary group of Japanese and American businessmen and 
government officials who together identify and analyze measures 
in Japan which inhibit the sales of U.S. products and to 
monitor the implementations of the HTN agreements. 
--The United States-Japan Trade Facilitation Committee 
was formed in September, 1977. It has helped expand our trade 
to Japan by identifying and dealing with specific problems 
encountered by individual American businessmen when dealing 
with Japanese laws or regulations. It has reviewed 22 cases of 
individual trade problems, of which it has satisfactorily 
resolved 19. 
We have learned that trade missions in both directions 
can help to assuage protectionist pressures. The Ikeda 
Mission, in the spring of 1978, followed by the Export 
Development Hissions to Japan and the Shin Sakura Haru, all 
have served to facilitate the flow of American goods to Japan. 
These examples are evidence of the mechanism we have put 
in place to identify problems at an early stage and solve them 
before they become unmanageable. vle have been successful in 
most cases because we have dealt with problems together. Our 
shared experiences have made us sensitive to the need to pay 
the closest attention to our economic ties and has also given 
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us greater confidence in our ability to control events and 
influence the directions in which our economies move. 
So I am confident that our partnership will be able to 
withstand future challenges and help to solve one of the nost 
fundamental issues facing the industrial nations -- the 
question of energy supplies. At the advanced nations economic 
summit in Tokyo in 1979, our countries made an important step 
toward reducing consumption of oil and speeding production of 
alternative sources. The United States is still the world's 
largest user of oil, but we have made significant progress in 
our energy conservation program. Oil consumption peaked in 
1978. Last year gasoline demand was down 8.5 percent and total 
oil consumption down 10 percent from 1978 levels. The United 
8tates and Japan have joined together in a major cooperative 
program to accelerate research and development . The OPEC 
member countries were faced with an apparent glut of oil during 
mid-1981, and this has allowed us to replenish our reserves of 
petroleu~ stocks. But this does not mean an end to the energy 
problem. The problem will exist as long as we must depend on 
that one.~olitically exploitable fuel. 
We are approaching our ongoing discussions of defense in 
the same spirit that 1~e have sought solutions to the economic 
problems. We respect the accomplishments Japan has already 
made in the defense area. In light of the current 
international situation, Japan, together with ourselves and our 
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European allies, must further strengthen our defense 
capabilities to meet common security challenges. The United 
States will continue to encourage Japan to make steady and 
significant improvements in their defense forces, while bearing 
in mind Japan's constitutional constraints. Japan has already 
taken measures to strengthen its self-defense capabiiity, 
including decisions to purchase the F-15, P-3C and E-2C as well 
as other modern weapons systems. Japan's increasing 
contributions to the cost of maintaining our forces in this 
country are most welcome and amount to almost $1 billion a 
year. In addition, American and Japanese unif~rmed services 
are working together to develop more detailed contingency plans 
in accordance with the planning guidelines adopted by our two 
governments in 1978. 
All of these developments enhance the credibility of 
Japan's self-defense capability, and in so doing add strength 
to the U.S.-Japan security relationship and the contribution it 
makes to the peace and stability of East Asia. Although the 
United States favors continued progress in this area and 
recognizes that this would entail commensurate increases in 
Japanese defense spending , we will not presume to tell Japan 
how to spend the money it budgets for defense. Cur countries 
maintain a continuing dialogue on all of these isssues, as is 
proper and necessary in an alliance. However, the United 
States recognizes and respects _the fact that the pace, the 
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extent and the direction of any increase in Japan's defense 
efforts remain, as they have always been, sovereign decisions 
for Japan to make. 
Japan is showing more self-confidence in international 
affairs. Over the past years there has been visible increase 
in the scope and activism of Japanese diplomacy. Some argue 
that Japan's political influence in the world, and its 
diplomatic reach, have not expanded as rapidly as has its 
economic power and worldwide network of economic interests. 
But even they would have to agree that in the past few years 
that anomaly has been significantly reduced as Japan has taken 
on major political responsibilities in a number of areas. 
First of all, Japan is taking on greater responsibilities 
for foreign economic development. From 1976 to 1980 Japan 
doubled its foreign assistance. In 1981 Japan expects to spend 
Y889 billion and from 1981 to 1985 it intends to again double 
the amount it spent on foreign assistance during the five 
previous years. Through economic assistance to such 
strategically important nations as Thailand, Turkey , Pakistan 
and Egypt, Japan makes valuable contributions to our common 
security interests. 
Secondly, Japan's relations with ASEAN countries can no 
longer be defined solely in economic terms . Japan's political 
and diplomatic support for those nations, no less than its 
large and indispensable contriqution to the Indochina refugee 
, 
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relief effort, has added new depth to its role in that region. 
The United States and Japan continue along parallel lines 
(trans: note) in our relations with the non-communist nations 
of Southeast Asia. \~ share similar interests there, both 
seeking to contribute to the resilience and the independence of 
those nations. Our policies are not coordinated, and indeed we 
are in some respect competitors there. But our competition is 
healthy and our approaches--as exemplified by our participation 
in the ASEA~ meeting in Manila this past June--are 
complementary. 
In addition, there has been a growing political dimension 
to Japan's ties with the nations of Hestern Europe. Two 
factors that have encouraged this process have been Japan's 
active participation in the OECD and its key role in the annual 
economic summit meetings of the major industrialized 
countries. The development of close trilateral coordination 
was seen in the need to develop a common response to the 
Iranian hostage situation and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghani stan. vlhi le its full inpact may not be felt for a 
number of years, its meaning is clear--Japan is going to play 
an increasingly important and varied role in the world. 
During the period when our Embassy in Iran was seized, 
Japan spoke out vigorously on behalf of legal and humanitarian 
principles, denounced the hostage seizure and called for the 
release of those innocent people. It joined with our European 
'" 
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friends and others around the world in imposing economic 
sanctions against Iran which helped lead to the release of the 
hostages. Japan's actions were by no means risk free; indeed, 
among our allies, Japan paid a high price to stand by us, and 
for that we are grateful. 
And, in respect to Afghanistan as well, Japan worked 
closely witl1 the United States and our other allies to impose 
penalities upon the Soviet Union for its invasion of that 
country and to insure that the Soviets understand that such 
actions can be taken without grave risk. Japan spoke out early 
against the aggression, joined the United States and other 
nations in boycotting the Moscow Glympic games, and 
participated in a framework of sanctions which we still hope 
will have an important cumulative effect. 
The challenges posed by events in Iran and Afghanistan, 
like some of the economic and trade problems we have had to 
grapple with in the past few years, have imposed some strains 
on our relations. Difficult decisions have been made. Hard 
choices were in order. Although a satisfactory solution to the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan appears elusive, the degree of 
unity and coordinated action of Japan, the United States and 
our other friends is most heartening. We have occasionally 
differed on tactics, on emphasis or on timing, but we have 
remained united and are determined to stay the course. As a 
result of joint action in response to the situations in Iran 
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and Afghanistan there more understanding of the multilateral 
responsibilities inherent in the phrase, U.S.-Japan relations. 
And there is noH a stronger commitment, on both sides of the 
Pacific, to mutual goals and joint action in achieving them. 
' I have traveled throughout Japan and I have spoken often 
in many places about the steady progress of our two nations 
toward a more equal partnership, about Japan assuming 
international responsibilities commensurate with its economic 
power. But only recently has this concept begun to be accepted 
by the Japanese people. The crises in Iran and Afghanistan in 
particular have contributed to this phenomenon. Clearly, 
during the situation in Iran the United States needed the 
support of its friends -- in Japan, in Europe and elsewhere. 
Events in both Iran and Afghanistan threatened the interests of 
the international community as whole and required a united 
response by peace-loving nations. Japan responded to those 
needs, demonstrating in the process--for its own people, for 
Americans and for the world--that Japan is a factor to be 
reckoned wiU1 on the international scene, and that the arch of 
our partnership is firm in more than just matters of trade. 
Japan's increasingly important role in the world has 
implication for all nations. For the United States it means 
that the ties with Japan, already the most important bilateral 
reltionship we have, will take pn even greater significance. 
It is even more essential that we consult closely with each 
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other and try to coordinate our policies as much as we can. 
The general orientation of our foreign policies will no doubt 
remain parallel (trans: note), resting as they do on a 
foundation of similar values, intersts and objectives. Thus 
there is no reason to expect any diminution in Japanese and 
American cooperation vis-a-vis major international issues, be 
they political, economic, scientific or security-related. On 
the contrary, I believe our partnership will deepen and produce 
major benefits, not only for Japan and the United States, but 
for the world. 
I believe that is so because I have personally 
experienced our growing relationship and as historian Henry 
tl II 
Brooks Adams said, experience is the arch to build upon. 
jo/js 
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